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Lucas Leaves Room for Categorical Defenses for 
Regulations of Wetlands that Are Critical to Water 
Resources and Essential for Public Drinking  
Shannon O’Shea* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Imagine living in a place where you do not have to question whether 
the water you are drinking on a daily basis is safe.  Each day you or your 
children consume water that you assume is nontoxic.  Suddenly, you realize 
that the water you or your children drink is vulnerable to bacterial and 
chemical contamination.  Your drinking water is at risk of containing chem-
icals that cause cancer, and pathogens that produce parasitic diseases.  Mil-
lions of people in your community, as well as future generations, are at risk 
of life-threatening diseases because of the actions of private individuals.  
Would you want the government to protect you and your family from drink-
ing contaminated water, or would you want the government to allow indi-
viduals to pollute critical water resources by dredging and filling wetlands?   
Freshwater on land is one of the most important resources on the pla-
net, and it is essential for human existence.1  Most of the planet’s water is 
found in the earth’s oceans.  Saltwater constitutes 97.5% of water, whereas 
freshwater in the earth’s glaciers only constitutes 2.5%.2  No more than 
eight thousandths of potable water is found on land, and it is this resource 
that is one of the most vital resources necessary for human existence.3  The 
freshwater ecosystems have been considerably changed and disturbed by 
humans.4  Threatened freshwater ecosystems include wetlands.  Govern-
mental regulations are designed to protect wetlands; however, wetlands are 
still being destroyed, resulting in one of the most vital resources becoming 
depleted.   
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1
 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY  581 
(Vicki Been & Erwin Chemerinsky ed., Aspen Publishers 2006).   
 
2
 Id.  
 
3
 Id.  
 
4
 See id. (addressing that humans have competed to trap water, pollute it, feed it to livestock, and 
channel it onto farms, which is the biggest single use of water).    
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Wetlands play a critical role in preserving water quality and quantity.5  
Approximately 221 million acres of wetlands6 once formed an immense 
support system for the United States.7  Throughout the history of the United 
States, wetlands have been cleared, drained, and developed.8  Scientists 
estimate that 53% of wetland losses occurred between the 1780s and 1980s 
due to agriculture and development.9  In the past, many people considered 
wetlands a nuisance because wetlands prevented agriculture, precluded 
development, obstructed travel, and attracted insects that ate nearby crops.10  
Scientists later learned about the importance of wetlands and significant 
protection efforts began in the 1960s; however, wetlands continued to dis-
appear.11    
Florida has lost more acres of wetlands than any other state.12  Flori-
da’s total land area is approximately 35 million acres.13  At one point in 
time, 60% of Florida was wetlands.14  Unfortunately, Florida only had about 
11.4 million acres of wetlands by the 1990s, which represented a loss of 
almost 44% of wetlands.15  Plans to drain Florida date back to its statehood 
in 1845 when the state legislature asked Congress to survey Florida.16  Con-
gress authorized Buckingham Smith to study Florida, which led to Smith’s 
                                                                                                                           
 
5
 JACK E. DAVIS & RAYMOND ARSENAULT, PARADISE LOST? THE ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF 
FLORIDA 133 (University Press of Florida 2005).   
 
6
 Until the early twentieth century, wetlands were defined as places unsuitable for agriculture 
because of the moisture on the land.  In the 1950s, the scientific community began to use the term “wet-
lands” instead of wet land.  The United States Army Corps of Engineers refers to wetlands as “those 
areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to 
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted 
for life in saturated soil conditions.”  Id. at 114; see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2010) (United States 
Army Corps of Engineers’ definition of wetlands).   
 
7
 ANN VILEISIS, DISCOVERING THE UNKNOWN LANDSCAPE:  A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S 
WETLANDS 11 (Island Press 1998).     
 
8
 Id. at 4.   
 
9
 Id. at 3.    
 
10
 DAVIS & ARSENAULT, supra note 5, at 121-22; see also VILEISIS, supra note 7, at 7 (describing 
how the perception of swamps and marshes for centuries as worthless and troublesome led to govern-
mental policies encouraging citizens to drain swamps by giving land grants and subsidies for the promo-
tion of drainage).  
 
11
 Wetlands perform water cleansing functions, reduce shoreline erosion, protect water tables 
from saltwater intrusion, and numerous threatened and endangered species depend on them for survival. 
John J. Fumero, Environmental Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law—At a Crossroads in Natural Re-
source Protection and Management in Florida, 19 NOVA L. REV. 77, 78 (1994); see also VILEISIS, supra 
note 7, at 4-8 (explaining that, although wetlands provide wildlife habitat, water quality, and flood 
protection, a centuries long tradition and powerful bias favoring agriculture and development persist 
despite growing awareness about the values of wetland ecosystems).   
 
12
 DAVIS & ARSENAULT, supra note 5, at 131.    
 
13
 Id. at 122.   
 
14
 Id. at  131.   
 
15
 Id.   
 
16
 Id. at 122.   
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1848 report establishing that Florida was “utter worthlessness to civilized 
man,” and that draining the Everglades, along with drying out South Florida 
by deepening rivers and digging canals, would be a reasonable decision. 17  
Under the Swamp Land Act of 1850, the federal government deeded most 
of the Everglades to the State of Florida on a condition that Smith’s plans 
be followed.18  Florida laid claim to approximately 22 million acres of wet-
lands under the Swamp Land Act of 1850.19  Congress used the proceeds to 
fund their “reclamation,” which meant modifying the landscape for agricul-
tural and urban development.20    
Florida’s wetlands did not remain under state control.21  Florida gave 
away and sold vast amounts of wetlands.22  Florida granted wetlands to cor-
porations in return for railroad construction, and either sold or gave millions 
of acres of swampland away to attract people and money.23  In 1881, Hamil-
ton Disston purchased 4 million acres of Florida swampland for the mere 
sum of one million dollars.24  Granting wetlands to private individuals 
created unforeseen problems of regulation.   
In the 1970s, Congress created a provision known as section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act giving the United States Army Corps of Engineers authori-
ty to issue or deny permits for discharges of dredged or fill material in regu-
lated wetlands.25  The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states private 
property shall not “be taken for public use without just compensation.”26  A 
per se regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment may be found 
when regulations completely deprive an owner of all economically viable 
use of her property, unless, “background principles of nuisance and proper-
ty law” independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property or 
when government mandates “permanent physical invasions of property.”27  
The Army Corps of Engineers is now in the difficult position of issuing 
permits because of the competing interests between developers of private 
property and environmentalists deeply concerned about the loss of wet-
                                                                                                                           
 
17
 See id. at 133.   
 
18
 Id. at 262. 
 
19
 Id. at 122.  
 
20
 Today reclamation means restoring previously drained wetlands.  Id. at 122.  
 
21
 Id. at 123.  
 
22
 Id.  
 
23
 Id.   
 
24
 Id.  
 
25
 PERCIVAL, supra note 1, at, 616.   
 
26
 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 
27
 See Lucas v. S.C Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).   
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lands.28  The denial of permits by the Army Corps of Engineers can lead to 
an unconstitutional taking of property.29   
Courts have traditionally upheld regulations preventing owners from 
using their land in a way that injures the community even when the regula-
tions severely limit land development by analogy to nuisance laws.30  Re-
cently, however, some courts have suggested or ruled that when wetland 
regulations prevent all land development, compensation is owed.31  In Flor-
ida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, a permit applicant filed a regula-
tory takings challenge against the Army Corps of Engineers in the early 
1980s for the denial of a section 404 permit, which resulted in a settlement 
of $21 million in 2001.32  Florida Rock bought land and started mining be-
fore the Clean Water Act dredge and fill permit system was created, and 
mining was the only economically viable use of the property.33  The proper-
ty suffered a 73.1% decrease in value because of the permit denial, and 
Florida Rock could not recoup its investment by selling the property.34  The 
Florida Rock litigation was a powerful reminder of the expensive conse-
quences of the Army Corps of Engineers’ permitting decisions.35   
After Florida Rock, the Army Corps of Engineers issued permits to 
members of the limestone mining industry to conduct mining in water con-
servation areas in Miami, Florida, which would directly destroy wetlands 
and potentially contaminate millions of gallons of drinking water drawn 
daily from the Biscayne Aquifer.36  In Sierra Club v. Flowers, environmen-
tal organizations brought an action against the Army Corps of Engineers 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the issuances of permits in 
water conservation areas.37  The district court suggested that the threat of 
additional takings claims, such as Florida Rock, was apparent in the permit-
ting decision, and also noted there was a high likelihood that procedural 
                                                                                                                           
 
28
 DAVIS & ARSENAULT, supra note 5, at 129.    
 
29
 Florida Rock Indus. Inc., v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999) (holding a regulatory taking 
occurred when Florida Rock was denied a mining permit).  
 
30
 Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm’n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991);  Presbytery of Seattle v. King 
County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash. 1990); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).   
 
31
 Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001); Palm Beach 
Isles Assoc. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Laguna Gatuna Inc. v. United States, 50 
Fed. Cl. 336 (2001); Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).   
 
32
 Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).    
 
33
 Id.  
 
34
 Florida Rock, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999); Sierra Club v. Flowers, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1301 (S.D. 
Fla. 2006), order supplemented by Sierra Club v. Strock, 495 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (S.D. Fla. 2007), vacated 
by Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2008).  
 
35
 See Sierra Club v. Flowers, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2006).  
 
36
 Id.  
 
37
 Id.   
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safeguards in the Clean Water Act and other Acts were overlooked because 
of the threat of additional takings litigation.38       
This Comment argues for a categorical defense to takings liability for 
regulations of wetlands that are critical to water resources and essential for 
public drinking.  Categorical defenses to takings liability established in a 
leading case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, leave room for 
regulations of wetlands that are critical to water resources and essential for 
public drinking.  This Comment argues that governmental regulations of 
wetlands that protect public health and safety should be immune from tak-
ings liability even when the regulations destroy property value. 
The goal of this Comment is to demonstrate the importance of wet-
lands and the reasons why regulations of wetlands that are critical to water 
resources and essential for public drinking should be immune from takings 
liability.  Part II of this Comment further explains the history of America’s 
wetlands, and in particular the history of Florida’s wetlands.  It also in-
cludes the reasons for the destruction of wetlands, which include increasing 
population and early harmful wetland regulations.  Part III focuses on ef-
forts at the national, state, and international levels to preserve wetlands.  It 
discusses the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, the 
“No Net Loss” of wetlands, and the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act, 
which all represent the initiatives taken by the federal government to pre-
serve wetlands.  The Clean Water Act is the primary authority for the feder-
al regulation of dredging or filling wetlands.  Part III later discusses initia-
tives taken by Florida to preserve wetlands, and it ends with a discussion on 
the Ramsar Convention.   
Despite the growing awareness of the importance of wetlands and the 
many efforts to protect wetlands at the national, state, and international le-
vels, wetlands are still threatened.  Under the Clean Water Act, developers 
are required to obtain a permit for dredging or filling wetlands.  If private 
property owners are denied a permit to develop wetlands, they can chal-
lenge the permit denials by claiming a regulatory taking.  Part IV addresses 
the problem of regulatory takings, and it discusses how takings claims can 
threaten the effectiveness of many Acts intended to protect wetlands.  It 
illustrates the problem of regulatory takings in Sierra Club v. Flowers and 
Sierra Club v. Strock.  Part IV includes an in-depth discussion on Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council’s categorical defenses to regulatory tak-
ings.  Part IV argues for a categorical defense to regulations of wetlands 
that are critical to water resources and essential for public drinking.  Part V 
continues to argue why Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council’s categor-
                                                                                                                           
 
38
 Id. at 1287.  
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ical defenses should solve the problem of regulatory takings, and suggests 
solutions to a few unresolved issues.  This Comment concludes by restating 
the significance of wetlands and the reasons wetland regulations should be 
immune from categorical takings liability.  
II. WETLANDS – THE HISTORY AND REASONS FOR LOSS   
A.  A Brief History of America’s Wetlands 
The United States had approximately 221 million acres of wetlands in 
the 1600s. 39  Changes to wetlands occurred between 1600 and 1800 in the 
original thirteen states.40  Over the next sixty years, wetlands mainly in the 
Midwest and South were destroyed by the drainage and development en-
couraged by the Swamp Land Acts.41  The federal government later funded 
wetland drainage from 1860-1950, and by the 1950s over 110 million acres 
of wetlands were lost.42  From the 1950s to the 1970s, 9 million acres of 
wetlands were destroyed.  From the mid- 1970s to the mid-1980s, 2.6 mil-
lion acres of wetlands were destroyed.43  From 1986 to 1997, 535,500 acres 
of wetlands were destroyed.44  Wetlands have been drained, mined, and 
dredged for various purposes, such as farming (responsible for 87% of wet-
land losses), mosquito control, navigation, flood protection, housing devel-
opments, construction, and the extraction of groundwater.45   In the North-
east, most of the transformation of wetlands occurred in the coastal-plain 
states for farming, developing ports, residential housing, and to provide 
navigation.46  In the Midwest, agriculture was the main reason for destroy-
ing wetlands.  For example, Indiana lost 85 % of its wetlands for cultiva-
tion.  Indiana, Missouri, Iowa, and California are the states with the most 
wetland losses, ranging between 87% and 91%.47  Although Indiana, Mis-
                                                                                                                           
 
39
 RALPH W. TINER, IN SEARCH OF SWAMPLAND 108 (Rutgers University Press 2d ed. 2005) 
(1998).    
 
40
 Id. at 109.  
 
41
 Id.  
 
42
 See generally PATRICK DUGAN, GUIDE TO WETLANDS 48 (Joanna Potts ed., Firefly Books 
2005) (explaining how the United States has lost 52% of wetlands and in some states the loss is greater).  
 
43
 TINER, supra note 39, at112. 
 
44
 LARS B. JOHANSON & GLENN W. KING, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006 
225 (Diane Pub. Co. 2005) (1878). 
 
45
 TINER, supra note 39, at 109-113;  see also DUGAN, supra note 42, at 48 (explaining that 80% 
of wetland loss has been to agriculture).  
 
46
 TINER, supra note 39, at 110 .  
 
47
 DAVIS &  ARSENAULT, supra note 5, at 131.    
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souri, Iowa, and California are the states with the most wetlands losses, 
Florida has also lost a significant amount of wetlands.48  
B.  A Brief History of Florida’s Wetlands 
One cannot think about Florida’s environmental history without also 
thinking about water.  Florida was born from water when it emerged from 
the sea several million years ago.49  Florida’s geology reveals that almost all 
of the state used to form the floor of the ocean.50  This explains why Flori-
da’s landscape is dominated by wetlands, and more than half of Florida 
used to consist of wetlands.51  Florida’s wetlands can be categorized into 
river swamps, still-water swamps, freshwater marshes, saltwater marshes, 
and mangroves.52  These swamps and marshes were considered a nuisance 
because they attracted insects, were thought to be the source of diseases, 
and were unfit for cultivation.53  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, many believed that if the water in the Everglades was drained, 
farms could be established on the rich soils.54 
In the early twentieth century, programs began to drain the wetlands in 
South Florida.  In 1906, agricultural developments became possible by 
draining the Everglades.55   
The 1906 project, led by Florida’s governor, Napoleon Bonaparte 
Broward, took decades to complete due to engineering problems, lack of 
money, and the hurricanes of 1926 and 1928.56  It was not until the 1940s 
that the wetland “reclamation” continued in the Everglades when the Feder-
                                                                                                                           
 
48
 In Florida, the Everglades and the Big Cypress Swamp have been greatly affected by wetland 
alterations.  Other swamps have also been destroyed.  The Great Kankakee Swamp used to be 1million 
acres, but now hardly any of it is left.  The Black Swamp was 120 miles long and 40 miles wide, but 
3million acres of it was drained and only 5% of it remains today.  Swamps were thought of as nuisances 
because mosquitoes carrying diseases were attracted to swamps.  See DUGAN, supra note 42, at 55; 
TINER, supra note 39, at 110 ; DAVIS & ARSENAULT, supra note 5, at 261.     
 
49
 DAVIS & ASENAULT, supra note 5, at 131.    
 
50
 Id.     
 
51
 See id. at 122-23 (Florida at one time may have had more than 60% of the state covered by 
wetlands).  
 
52
 Id. at 116.    
 
53
 Id. at 122.    
 
54
 Drainage received political support from Governor Napoleon Broward, and in 1906 one of the 
greatest attempts at reclamation in American history began by digging canals, constructing levees, and 
moving out the Everglades from Fort Lauderdale.  EDWARD A. FERNALD & ELIZABETH D. PURDUM,  
ATLAS OF FLORIDA,106 (University Press of Florida 1992).  
 
55
 DAVIS & ARSENAULT, supra note 5, at 144.    
 
56
 Id. at 124.    
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al government gave funds to the Army Corps of Engineers.57  Between 1845 
and 1920, Florida lost 3.5 million acres of wetlands.58    
The draining of the Everglades wetlands was not only due to agricul-
ture, but also because of flooding and development.  The 1947 hurricanes 
flooded fifteen thousand square miles of Florida, which resulted in the Ar-
my Corps of Engineers developing a plan to prevent flooding by widening 
and deepening old canals, digging new canals, building massive pumps to 
drive water from fields into Lake Okeechobee, and creating evaporation 
ditches.59  The creation of Tamiami Trail highway, starting in the summer of 
1915, also contributed to the drainage of the Everglades.60  The highway 
was created by building a route straight through the center of the Ever-
glades, and it disrupted more than 4 million acres of land and water.61   
Presently, billions of dollars are being spent to cure past mistakes of 
draining and destroying the Everglades.62  Recent experience demonstrates 
the importance of wetlands in providing water quality by performing water 
cleansing functions, reducing erosion, protecting water tables from saltwa-
ter intrusion, and providing a habitat for endangered species.63  Most impor-
tantly, draining wetlands affects the quantity and quality of water.64  Wet-
lands provide a range of services including water purification and ground-
                                                                                                                           
 
57
 Id. (explaining that during the reclamation, 700,000 acres of farmland were carved out of the 
Everglades).  
 
58
 Id. at 125.  
 
59
 See ALLEN MORISS & JOAN PERRY MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 2005-2006 509 (The 
Peninsular Pub. Co. 30th ed. 2005) (noting that the Hurricanes of 1926 and 1928 also created major 
engineering works because of the surplus water created by the hurricanes); see also FERNALD & 
PURDUM, supra note 54, at 81.  
 
60
 See DAVIS &  ARSENAULT, supra note 5, at 261 (noting that the summer of 1915 launched a 
road building project to create Tamiami Trail, a paved highway west from Miami to the Gulf of Mexico, 
then north through Fort Myers and all the way to Tampa. Tamiami Trail’s route went through the center 
of the southern Everglades and Big Cypress Swamp); see also FERNALD & PURDUM, supra note 54, at 
105.  
 
61
 See DAVIS &  ARSENAULT, supra note 5,  at 261 (stating that Tamiami trail symbolizes the 
decades long movement to clear Florida of the Everglades).  
 
62
 See generally ALLEN MORRIS & JOAN PERRY MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 2005-2006 
509 (The Peninsular Pub. Co. 30th ed. 2005) (stating that almost 50 years of experience demonstrates 
the need of the Everglades by people, creatures, and plants); see also DAVIS &  ARSENAULT, supra note 
5, at 124  (stating that $7.8 billion is currently being spent by state and federal government authorities to 
restore the Everglades).  
 
63
 See John J. Fumero, Environmental Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law—At A Crossroads In 
Natural Resource Protection And Management In Florida, 19 NOVA L. REV. 77, 78 (1994); see also 
DAVIS &  ARSENAULT, supra note 5, at 132 (providing that increased public awareness of wetlands 
functions and values have led to public polices intended to protect wetlands).  
 
64
 See DAVIS &  ARSENAULT, supra note 5, at 133 (describing that the reason wetlands are wet is 
because of groundwater or nearby springs discharging water on the surface.  Most of Florida’s water 
supply is pumped from the ground. Pumping too much groundwater can even dry wetlands).  
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water recharge.65  When water moves from a wetland into an underground 
aquifer, it recharges the groundwater and the water becomes cleaner than 
when it was on the surface due to natural filtration.66  An aquifer is a rock 
deposit underneath earth’s surface storing underground water.67  An aquifer 
may consist of gravel, sandstone, sand, or limestone.  Groundwater is sub-
surface water that moves slowly through permeable rocks and is reple-
nished by precipitation.  This groundwater is important for human con-
sumption because once in the aquifer, the water can be drawn through 
wells.68    
Groundwater is the largest single supply of freshwater available for 
use by humans.69  
Freshwater accounts for less than three percent of earth’s water; ac-
cessible groundwater accounts for .31 percent.70  Over the past fifty years, 
global water consumption has tripled.71  Humans are extracting water from 
aquifers at a greater rate than the rate of replenishment, which causes the 
water levels to decrease.72  Water in aquifers is decreasing at rates between 
two and eight meters per year in every continent.73  The impact of an in-
creasing population is a major cause of over-pumping aquifers.  
C.  America’s Population Growth  
In the year 1790, the population of the United States was just under 
four million.74  In 2000, the population count rose to approximately 280 
million.75  With this increase in population came an increase in water with-
drawals.  In 1940, the number of gallons of water withdrawn per day in the 
United States was 140 billion.76  Sixty years later, a little over 400 billion 
                                                                                                                           
 
65
 See JODY FREEMAN & CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 323 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).  
 
66
 See DUGAN, supra note 42 at 17. 
 
67
 Id.  
 
68
 Id.  
 
69
 See Cartographic Applications and Processing Program, http://capp.water.usgs.gov; see also 
HERMAN E. DALY & JOSHUA FARLEY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 87 (Island Press 2004) (stating that 
fresh water accounts for less than three percent of water on the planet.  Exploited lakes account for .009 
percent, rivers .0001 percent, accessible groundwater .31 percent, .01 percent in the atmosphere, .31 
percent is deep groundwater, and about 2 percent in earth’s polar ice caps and glaciers).  
 
70
 See DALY & FARLEY, supra note 69, at 87.  
 
71
 Id.  
 
72
 Id.  
 
73
 Id. at 117. 
 
74
 JOHANSON & KING, supra note 44, at 8 (stating that the population was exactly 3,929,214 
million people). 
 
75
 See id. (stating that the population was exactly 281, 424, 602 million people).  
 
76
 Id. at 226.  
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gallons were withdrawn per day.77  Much of the water for human consump-
tion is groundwater withdrawn from aquifers through wells.78  In 2002, the 
United States was ranked third in the world for countries with extensive 
over-pumping of aquifers.79  Almost half of all irrigation water in the United 
States comes from underground.  Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska receive most 
of their irrigation water from the Ogallala aquifer, which has little recharge 
because it is essentially a fossil aquifer.80  The underground water table has 
dropped by 100 feet in parts of Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas.81  Florida’s 
water tables have also dropped because of increases in population.82  
In the twentieth century, Florida had a great increase in population.83  
In every decade since the 1920s, Florida has been in the top four states in 
increases in population.84  In the 1980s, there was a 33 percent increase in 
population resulting in an increase of 3.2 million people, and in the 1990s, 
Florida’s population increased another twenty percent.85  In 2000, Florida 
had over 15.9 million persons and the Census Bureau predicts Florida will 
become the nation’s third largest state between 2015 and 2020.86  The first 
census of Florida was taken in 1830, and it reported 34,730 persons.  By the 
turn of the century, Florida’s population increased over a half a million.87  
The decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were times of exceptional pop-
ulation growth, when nearly one thousand people per day moved into South 
                                                                                                                           
 
77
 Id.   
 
78
 Id.    
 
79
 LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B: RESCUING A PLANET UNDER STRESS AND A CIVILIZATION IN 
TROUBLE 26 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2003).  
 
80
 Id. at 41.  
 
81
 Id. at 29   
 
82
 See id. at 1-26 (stating that humanity’s demands on the earth have multiplied over the last half-
century.  As the world’s population has doubled, the world’s water is facing a deficit. The imminent 
water deficit usually takes the form of aquifer over-pumping, which is mainly due to increases in popu-
lation). 
 
83
 See FERNALD & PURDUM, supra note 54, at 81 (stating that Florida’s increases in population 
have ranked highest in the nation).  
 
84
 See MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 59, at 621(stating that Florida’s extraordinary growth since 
World War II has come from retirees and workers from other states and also from refugees from Cuba, 
Haiti, and Vietnam); see also  FERNALD & PURDUM, supra note 54, at 6.    
 
85
 See MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 59, at 621 (stating that the population increase of the 1980s 
was the largest in Florida’s history and second largest in the United States); see also UNIVERSITY OF 
FLORIDA, FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2006  6  (Univ. of Florida Bureau of Economics 40th ed. 
2006) (percentage changed 23.5 percent between 1990 and 2000).  
 
86
 See id.; see also UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2006 6 (Univ. of 
Florida Bureau of Economics 40th ed. 2006) (Florida’s total population was 15, 982, 378 in 2000).   
 
87
 FERNALD & PURDUM, supra note 54, at 97; UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, FLORIDA STATISTICAL 
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Florida.88  In 2000, Miami-Dade was the most populous county in Florida 
with a population of over two million.89  With this increase in people came 
an increase in the demand for water and development, which further de-
stroyed wetlands.90  Although population increases are a main reason for the 
destruction of wetlands, it is not the only reason why many wetlands that 
once existed do not exist today.  Many early federal wetlands regulations 
also contributed to the loss of wetlands.    
D.  Early Wetland Regulations 
The Swamp and Overflow Land Acts of 1849, 1850, and 1860 pro-
moted wetland drainage.  Millions of acres of wetlands were transferred 
from the federal government to the states to reclaim swamplands for agri-
culture and development.91  In 1905, 82 million acres of wetlands had been 
claimed by fifteen states.92  Following these Acts, nearly half of these wet-
lands were destroyed by drainage projects.93  The Swamp and Overflow 
Land Acts were not the only Acts contributing to the loss of wetlands.   
The Flood Control Acts, enacted by Congress between the years 1928 
and 1965,94resulted in the Army Corps of Engineers spending billions of 
dollars for the construction of levees, reservoirs, and dams for the purpose 
of flood control.95  The Flood Control Act of 1944 was enacted after severe 
flooding devastated the lower Missouri River basin and authorized the Ar-
my Corps of Engineers to build major projects for draining agricultural 
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lands.96  In the process of building levees, reservoirs, and dams to prevent 
floods, wetlands were destroyed.  
Throughout the history of the United States, millions of acres of wet-
lands were destroyed.  Wetlands were destroyed not only because of Ameri-
ca’s increasing population, which required development and increasing 
water withdrawals, but also because of early wetland regulations.  The 
Swamp and Overflow Land Acts and the Flood Control Acts both contri-
buted to the loss of wetlands.  Unfortunately, the effort to preserve wetlands 
did not arise until the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), which is 
now called the Clean Water Act (CWA).97 
III.  WETLAND PRESERVATION  
Wetland preservation started in the 1970s with the enactment of the 
NEPA.  The primary authority, however, for wetland regulation is the CWA.  
Many other initiatives were taken by the federal government to conserve 
wetlands, such as President George H. W. Bush’s policy of “No Net Loss” 
of wetlands and also the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986.  In-
itiatives to preserve wetlands were not only taken by the federal govern-
ment, but also by state governments.  The Florida Constitution and Florida 
Statutes both provide protection for wetlands.  Initiatives to preserve wet-
lands by the federal government include the NEPA, the CWA, the “No Net 
Loss Policy” of wetlands, and the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 
1986.  
A.  The National Environmental Policy Act 
The NEPA, signed into law by President Nixon in 197098, imposes re-
quirements on those seeking permits for activities involving dredging or 
filling.99  It was the first modern federal environmental statute setting forth 
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broad goals for the nation’s environmental policy.100  The NEPA required 
the federal government to use all practicable means and measures to create 
conditions for man and nature to exist in harmony and “fulfill the social, 
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans.”101  Section 102(2)(C) of the NEPA requires that a federal agen-
cy prepare a “detailed statement,” known as an “environmental impact 
statement” (EIS), when it intends to take a major federal action significantly 
affecting the quality of human environment.102  The EIS must identify (1) 
environmental impacts of the proposed action; (2) adverse environmental 
effects which cannot be avoided; (3) alternatives to the action; (4) the rela-
tionship between short-term uses of man’s environment and the mainten-
ance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and (5) any irreversible 
and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the 
proposed action should it be implemented.103  In sum, the EIS describes the 
proposed federal action, discusses environmental impacts, and reports alter-
natives along with their environmental effects.104  
Congress also created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to 
coordinate each federal agency’s compliance with the NEPA.105  Section 
202 establishes the CEQ, which is created in the executive office of the 
president and is composed of three members.106  The duties and functions of 
the CEQ include analyzing and interpreting environmental trends, reporting 
on the conditions of the environment, gathering information, appraising 
programs and activities of the federal government, and formulating and 
recommending national policies that promote the improvement of the quali-
ty of the environment.107   
B.  The Clean Water Act 
The NEPA is not the only Act that contributes to the preservation of 
wetlands.  The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), now called 
the Clean Water Act (CWA), is the primary authority for the federal regula-
tion of dredging or filling wetlands.108  The Federal Water Pollution Control 
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Act of 1972 is the modern federal regulation of water pollution.109  The pur-
pose of the FWPCA is to restore and maintain the “chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”110  In 1977, the FWCPA was 
amended and renamed the CWA.111  The CWA is the primary law conserv-
ing wetlands in the United States.112 
Section 311 of the CWA prohibits discharges of pollutants into “navig-
able waters,” which is defined as “waters of the United States,” unless au-
thorized by permit.113  Approximately ninety-eight to ninety-nine percent of 
the bodies of water in the United States are not navigable, but the quality of 
navigable waters is greatly affected by non-navigable waters and wetlands 
adjacent to both navigable and nonnavigable waters.114  In United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the definition 
of “waters of the United States” encompasses all wetlands adjacent to other 
bodies of water.115  Section 311 would seem to prevent the filling of most 
wetlands, but the CWA provides an exception.   
Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit for the disposal of dredged 
or fill material into navigable waters.116  The jurisdictional reach of a section 
404 permit extends to wetlands.117  Section 404 grants authority to the Army 
Corps of Engineers to issue permits for the disposal of dredged or fill ma-
terial into wetlands.118  The Army Corps of Engineers may issue permits on 
a state, regional, or national basis for any category of activities involving 
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discharges of dredged or fill material, after public notice and opportunity 
for public hearings, if “(1) the activities in such category are similar in na-
ture, (2) will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when per-
formed separately, and (3) will have only minimal cumulative adverse ef-
fect on the environment.”119  During the permit process, the Army Corps of 
Engineers must issue a statement of finding, or a record of decision, if an 
environmental impact statement was prepared.120  
The CWA prohibits issuance of a dredge or fill permit if “(1) an envi-
ronmentally preferable and practicable alternative exists, or (2) the pro-
posed mining activity will cause or contribute to significant degradation of 
the subject wetlands measured by significantly adverse effects on municipal 
water supplies, wildlife and wildlife habitat, or aesthetic values, or (3) the 
potential adverse impacts are not minimized through appropriate and prac-
tical steps.”121  
An essential feature to the section 404 permitting process includes 
measures to mitigate the losses of wetlands by creating new wetlands or 
improving degraded areas of wetlands.122  Mitigation measures are contro-
versial because environmentalists claim the measures make it easy to obtain 
a section 404 permit when practicable alternatives exist, and also because 
the benefits of natural wetlands outweigh artificial wetlands, which occa-
sionally fail.123   
C.  “No Net Loss”  
The “No Net Loss” of wetlands, created by President George Bush in 
1989, established a national goal that for each acre of wetland destroyed, 
one acre of wetland must be created.124  Four years later, President Clinton 
reiterated the commitment of no net loss of wetlands during his cam-
paign.125  The policy was later reaffirmed in 2002 by President George W. 
Bush and again in 2004 when he challenged the nation on increasing water 
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quantity and quality.126  Under the policy, one must first prevent impacts to 
wetlands and if the impacts are not avoidable, then one must minimize the 
impacts through mitigation, which may include restoring degraded wet-
lands, preserving wetlands, or creating wetlands.127     
Mitigation activities are falling short of former President Bush’s “No 
Net Loss” of wetlands.  The goal, that for every acre of wetlands destroyed 
one must be created, is not being met.128  During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Corps relied on prescrip-
tive regulation to discourage wetland development.129  If a permit under the 
CWA was granted for the filling or dredging of wetlands, on-site mitigation 
of destroyed wetlands was required to ensure no net loss.130  During the 
1990s, agencies and governments favored a market mechanism to ensure no 
net loss of wetlands.131  The market mechanism is known as Wetland Miti-
gation Banking (WMB).  Wetlands are created, restored, or preserved for 
developers of wetlands to buy as a condition for a permit.132  Under the 
CWA, when applying for a section 404 permit to dredge or fill wetlands, a 
developer must restore, create, or preserve wetlands to compensate for the 
existing wetlands destroyed.  The Mitigation Banking Review Team 
(MBRT) approves mitigation banks.133  The MBRT establishes conditions of 
the bank site, performance standards, and conditions for releasing credits.134  
Once a WMB meets performance standards, credits are produced.  One may 
use the mitigation credits or sell the credits to a developer who needs to 
satisfy a permit condition.135 
Many studies have found that mitigation banking is not successful.136  
Many restored or created wetlands have reverted back to its original habitat 
because developers planted only what was necessary to meet permit re-
quirements, and then developers left the wetland to revert back to being a 
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wetland in name only.137  Other problems within WMB include unequal 
trades of wetlands.  Not all wetlands are equal because wetlands differ in 
the services they deliver, the type, and their location.138  The “No Net Loss” 
of wetlands should include not only the loss of acreage, but also the loss of 
their functional value.139    
Distributional equity is another problem with mitigation banking.140  
Developers create wetlands in rural areas where land is cheap, and they 
destroy wetlands in urban areas where land is valuable.  The existing wet-
lands in urban areas provide important services to urban populations.  The 
urban populations need the services the wetlands provide, but developers 
are not creating wetlands in urban areas.  Instead, developers create wet-
lands in rural areas where their services are not needed.141  Although the 
“No Net Loss” of wetlands has received much criticism, mitigation is not 
the only way to preserve wetlands.  Protecting wetlands through acquisition 
in fee is also a means of wetland preservation.  The Emergency Wetlands 
Resources Act (EWRA) provides for protecting wetlands though acquisition 
in fee.   
D.  Emergency Wetlands Resources Act 
In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act 
(EWRA) with the purpose of promoting the conservation of wetlands of the 
nation to maintain public benefits that wetlands provide and to fulfill inter-
national obligations contained in various treaties for migratory birds.142  
Congress would promote the conservation of wetlands by: “(1) intensifying 
cooperative efforts among private interests and local, State, and Federal 
governments; and (2) intensifying efforts to protect the wetlands of the Na-
tion through acquisition in fee, easements or other interests and methods by 
local, State, and Federal governments and the private sector.”143    
Congress made numerous findings on the importance of wetlands.144  
Some of Congress’s findings on the importance of wetlands are as follows: 
(1) wetlands play an important role in maintaining the quality of life by 
contributing to food supply; water supply and quantity, and flood control; 
(2) wetlands enhance the water quality and water supply of the nation by 
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serving as groundwater recharge areas; (3) wetlands provide habitat for 
migratory birds for breeding, wintering, or migration; and (4) wetlands pro-
vide a natural means of flood and erosion control.145  
The NEPA, the CWA, and the EWRA all contribute to the preservation 
of wetlands.  Despite the criticism that President Bush’s “No Net Loss” 
policy has received for not adequately preserving wetlands, the NEPA and 
the CWA are effective ways to protect wetlands, but only absent a threat of 
a takings claim if one is denied a permit to dredge or fill wetlands.  The 
NEPA, the CWA, the “No Net Loss” of wetlands, and the EWRA are not 
the only efforts to conserve wetlands.  State governments have also enacted 
legislation for the preservation of wetlands.  Florida’s Constitution and 
Florida Statutes both provide for wetland preservation.   
E.  Florida Wetland Preservation  
In Florida, wetland preservation has become the center of attention for 
environmentalists and legislators.  The Florida Legislature and conserva-
tionists are struggling to preserve many of Florida’s wetlands.  The Florida 
Constitution and Florida Statutes both provide protection for wetlands.  
 
1.  The Florida Constitution 
 
   The Florida Constitution, Article II, Section 7(a) states: “It shall be 
the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scen-
ic beauty.  Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air 
and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise and for the con-
servation and protection of natural resources.”146 
2.  Florida Statutes  
a.  The Florida Water Resources Act of 1972  
The Florida Water Resources Act of 1972 (FWRA) provides authority 
for all Florida water management districts to protect the water resources of 
the state.147  There are five water management districts in Florida.148  The 
five districts include the Northwest Florida Water Management District, the 
Suwannee River Water Management District, the St. Jones River Water 
Management District, the Southwest Florida Water Management District, 
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and the South Florida Water Management District.149  The entire Everglades 
ecosystem, from Lake Okeechobee to the Florida Keys, lies within the 
South Florida Water Management District.150  FWRA establishes Florida’s 
jurisdiction over wetlands by defining “wetlands” and “waters of the 
state.”151  The FWRA is not the only Florida Statute contributing to the pre-
servation of wetlands.  The Land Conservation Act of 1972 also contributes 
to the preservation of wetlands.  
b.  The Land Conservation Act of 1972 
The Land Conservation Act of 1972 establishes a land acquisition pro-
gram to conserve and protect lands situated in areas of critical state con-
cern.
152
  Lands situated in areas of critical state concern include: 
An area containing, or having a significant impact upon, environmen-
tal or natural resources of regional or statewide importance, including, 
but not limited to, state or federal parks, forests, wildlife refuges, wil-
derness areas, aquatic preserves, major rivers and estuaries, state envi-
ronmentally endangered lands, Outstanding Florida Waters, and aqui-
fer recharge areas, the uncontrolled private or public development of 
which would cause substantial deterioration of such resources.153 
In addition to the FWRA and the Land Conservation Act of 1972 pro-
viding for the preservation of wetlands in Florida, the Warren S. Henderson 
Wetlands Protection Act of 1984 and the Florida Environmental Reorgani-
zation Acts of 1975 and 1993 also provide for the protection of wetlands.   
c. The Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984 and the 
Florida Environmental Reorganization Acts of 1975 and 1993 
Prior to the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984, the 
Florida Environmental Reorganization Act of 1975 established a wetland 
resource permitting program for dredge and fill activities in wetlands cov-
ered by Florida Statutes, Chapter 403.154  The Chapter 403 wetlands permit-
ting program was later modified in 1984 under the Warren S. Henderson 
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Wetlands Protection Act.155  In 1993, the Florida Legislature enacted the 
Florida Environmental Reorganization Act (FERA).156  FERA integrated the 
Chapter 403 wetlands resource permits into Chapter 373, “Management and 
Storage of Surface Waters,” with the objective to create a unified state per-
mitting process, which is known as the Environmental Resource Permit 
(ERP) program.157  FERA also merged the Department of Environmental 
Regulation and Natural Resources into a newly created agency: the De-
partment of Environmental Protection (DEP).158    
Under FERA, an applicant for a permit to conduct activities in surface 
waters and wetlands must provide reasonable assurance that state water 
quality standards will not be violated, and an applicant must provide rea-
sonable assurance that activity in, on, or over surface waters or wetlands is 
not contrary to the public interest.159  In determining whether an activity is 
contrary to the public interest, the following criteria are considered:  
1. Whether the activity will adversely affect the public health, safety, 
or welfare or the property of others; 2. Whether the activity will ad-
versely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endan-
gered or threatened species, or their habitats; 3. Whether the activity 
will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful 
erosion or shoaling; 4. Whether the activity will adversely affect the 
fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of 
the activity; 5. Whether the activity will be of a temporary or perma-
nent nature; 6. Whether the activity will adversely affect or will en-
hance significant historical and archaeological resources under the 
provisions of s. 267.061; and 7. The current condition and relative 
value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed 
activity.160 
If an applicant is unable to meet the above criteria, the governing de-
partment must consider measures to mitigate adverse effects when deciding 
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to grant or deny a permit.161  Measures to mitigate adverse effects caused by 
the activity may include onsite mitigation, offsite mitigation, and the pur-
chase of mitigation credits.162  The mitigation must offset the adverse effects 
caused by the activity.163  Although mitigation was an attractive solution to 
conserving wetlands, it was not the only solution.  Seven years after the 
FERA was enacted, the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida Preservation 
2000 Act to further preserve wetlands.  
d.  Florida Preservation 2000 Act  
The Florida Preservation 2000 Act creates a funding mechanism for 
land acquisition programs in Florida to protect the integrity of ecological 
systems.164  The Legislature found that the development of Florida’s natural 
areas to accommodate rapid population growth contributed to the degrada-
tion of water resources, destruction of wildlife habitats, and the diminish-
ment of wetlands.165  The Legislature also found that South Florida’s water 
supply depends on the protection of lands buffering the East Everglades and 
the Everglades water conservation areas.166  Development of natural areas 
created a need for public land acquisition to preserve the quality of life in 
Florida.167  The Legislature recognized the urgency of acquiring natural 
areas for preservation and declared its intent to fund the implementation of 
the Florida Preservation 2000 Act for each of the 10 years of the program’s 
duration.168 
The Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes both contribute to wet-
land preservation.  The importance of the preservation of wetlands is not 
only a federal goal, but it is also a state goal.  The FWRA, the Land Con-
servation Act, the FERA, and the Florida Preservation 2000 Act all provide 
for the conservation of wetlands.  Wetland preservation is not only the cen-
ter of attention at federal and state levels but also at the international level. 
e. International Wetland Protection  
The Ramsar Convention, known as the Convention on Wetlands, is the 
first modern environmental treaty on the conservation and sustainable use 
                                                                                                                           
 
161
 Id.   
 
162
 Id.  
 
163
 Id.   
 
164
 FLA. STAT. § 259.101 (2008). 
 
165
 FLA. STAT. § 259.101(2)(a) (2008). 
 
166
 FLA. STAT. § 259.101(2)(e) (2008). 
 
167
 FLA. STAT. § 259.101(2)(b) (2008). 
 
168
 FLA. STAT. § 259.101(2) (2008). 
264 FIU Law Review [5:243 
 
of natural resources.169  The Convention on Wetlands was signed in Ramsar, 
Iran, in 1971, and it presently consists of 158 parties.170  The Ramsar Con-
vention imposes obligations on parties to designate at least one wetland site 
within its territory as a wetland of international importance.171  There are 
presently 1,718 designated wetland sites in the Ramsar Convention.172  
Identifying wetlands of international importance is based on the type of the 
wetland, the presence of endangered species, and the site’s support of wa-
terbirds and fish.173  The parties should conserve the wetlands that are des-
ignated wetlands of international importance and should wisely use other 
wetlands.174  The Convention’s mission statement is “the conservation and 
wise use of all wetlands through local, regional and national actions and 
international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable 
development throughout the world.”175 
The NEPA, the CWA, the “No Net Loss” of wetlands, and the EWRA 
represent the initiatives taken by the federal government to preserve wet-
lands.  The NEPA places requirements on those seeking permits for activi-
ties involving dredging or filling.  Those who seek to develop wetlands 
need a Section 404 permit from the Corps under the CWA.  The NEPA re-
quires the Corps to follow certain procedures before issuing a permit for 
dredging or filling wetlands.  The NEPA and the CWA both contribute to 
the preservation of wetlands by requiring both developers and the Corps to 
meet certain criteria before a permit is issued for dredging or filling a wet-
land.  There were not only federal initiatives to preserve wetlands, but also 
state initiatives. 
Florida enacted the FWRA of 1972, the Land Conservation Act of 
1972, the FERA of 1975, the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act 
of 1984, and the FERA of 1993.  All of the Florida Statutes provided meas-
ures for the protection of wetlands.  The Florida Statutes protected wetlands 
by requiring a permit to dredge or fill wetlands.  The Florida Statutes also 
conserved wetlands by providing for acquisition of wetlands or mitigation.  
Wetland preservation has become the center of attention not only at state 
and national levels, but also at the international level through the Ramsar 
Convention. 
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Despite the growing awareness of the importance of wetlands and the 
many efforts to protect wetlands at the national, state, and international le-
vels, wetlands are still threatened.   Developers continue to seek permits 
under the CWA, and the Army Corps of Engineers continue to grant the 
permits.  Requiring permits under the CWA at the federal level and under 
the FERA of 1993 at the state level in Florida is an effective way to protect 
wetlands, but only if there is not the threat of a takings claim if a private 
property owner is denied a permit. 
IV. THE PROBLEM – REGULATORY TAKINGS 
Public awareness of the importance of wetlands and the consequences 
of their destruction led to significant governmental regulations to protect 
wetlands, but private property owners can threaten the effectiveness of the 
regulations by claiming an unconstitutional taking.  When private property 
owners are required to obtain permits to develop wetlands, but are denied 
permits by the regulatory agency in charge of granting the permit, develop-
ers challenge the permit denials by claiming a regulatory taking.  This 
creates a problem between conserving wetlands and private property rights.  
This problem was apparent in Sierra Club v. Flowers and Sierra Club v. 
Strock, when the Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit to a mining 
company without performing the requirements in the NEPA and the 
CWA.176  The Army Corps of Engineers was reminded of an earlier case, 
Florida Rock Industries v. United States, when the Army Corps of Engi-
neers denied a permit, and the denial was challenged as a regulatory tak-
ing.177  Florida Rock Industries eventually settled for $21 million dollars.178  
The CWA and many other legislative enactments that are intended to pro-
tect wetlands are not an effective means of preserving wetlands if regulato-
ry agencies are threatened with takings claims.  Agencies will negotiate 
with developers instead of serving as regulatory agencies.  An example of 
this situation can be seen in Sierra Club v. Strock. 
A.  Sierra Club v. Strock 
In 2007 the Southern District of Florida, in Sierra Club v. Strock, was 
presented with the question of what further relief should be granted to 
plaintiffs in light of the conclusions in Sierra Club v. Flowers that the de-
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fendants, the Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS), committed multiple violations of numerous Acts 
including the CWA and the NEPA.179  In Sierra Club v. Flowers, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of 
environmental plaintiffs and against the Corps, the FWS, and several pri-
vate mining companies.180  The plaintiffs challenged the Army Corps of 
Engineers’ issuance and extension of dredge and fill permits allowing li-
mestone mining on wetlands.181  The violations occurred in relation to the 
issuance of the CWA, Section 404(b), permits in April 2002 to nine private 
corporations for the destruction of approximately fifty-four hundred acres 
of wetlands in Miami, Florida, to remove the underlying limestone for 
processing into cement, concrete blocks, and other products.182 
The Court’s order granting summary judgment for plaintiffs in Sierra 
Club v. Flowers concluded the permits should not have been issued because 
the Army Corps of Engineers and FWS made numerous decisions lacking a 
rational basis, and they failed to consider all relevant factors in the permit-
ting decision.183  The court found the Army Corps of Engineers violated the 
NEPA by approving mining in close proximity to a wellfield before the risk 
of contamination had been adequately studied.184  The mining was approved 
in close proximity to the Northwest Wellfield and its multiple wellheads 
from which drinking water is pumped daily.  The Army Corps of Engineers 
also violated the NEPA requirement that all indirect effects be addressed by 
dismissing negative impacts of increasing urbanization when preparing the 
EIS.185  The Army Corps of Engineers violated the CWA by not complying 
with public participation requirements.186 
In Sierra Club v. Strock, Judge Hoeveler, in deciding what relief 
should be granted, held that the section 404 permits would be properly set 
aside to members of the limestone mining industry to conduct mining in 
water conservation areas pursuant to the NEPA and the CWA.187  Keeping 
limestone products available for purchase and collecting funds from mining 
companies to be used to acquire wetland restoration did not outweigh the 
risk of wellfield contamination, destruction of wetlands, and potentially 
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damaging seepage impacts.188  Conducting mining in water conservation 
areas could also contaminate millions of gallons of drinking water drawn 
daily from the Biscayne Aquifer in Miami, Florida.189 
The court suggested that the Army Corps of Engineers negotiated with 
the developers instead of serving as a regulatory agency.190  Judge Hoeveler 
also questioned what role the threat of a taking played in the permitting 
decision and recognized the likelihood that procedural safeguards in the 
CWA and other Acts were overlooked because of the threat of takings litiga-
tion.191  The threat of the mining companies challenging the denial of a 
permit as a taking was apparent because of the decision in Florida Rock 
Industries v. United States, in which the government settled a takings chal-
lenge for $21 million in 2001.192 
B.  Florida Rock Industries v. United States 
In Florida Rock Industries v. United States, a mining company pur-
chased a parcel of land and, pursuant to the subsequent enactment of the 
CWA Amendments of 1972, applied for a permit.193  The Army Corps of 
Engineers denied Florida Rock’s application for a mining permit to mine 
ninety-eight acres of wetlands.194  Florida Rock later filed a suit, seeking 
just compensation for a regulatory taking.195  Florida Rock initially won in 
the Federal Court of Claims, and its claim survived several appeals and 
remands.196  The initial award in the claims court was for $1,029,000.197  
Florida Rock later expanded its claim to the entire 1,560 wetland acres it 
owned, and it was awarded $10.5 million.198  Florida Rock eventually set-
tled the case in 2001 for $21 million.199 
The problem that the Army Corps of Engineers has between satisfying 
developers of private property and environmentalists, apparent in Florida 
Rock Industries v. United States and Sierra Club v. Flowers, will continue 
to reappear.  Private property owners will continue to challenge permit de-
nials by claiming the denial constituted a regulatory taking.  There are two 
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tests to determine whether a regulatory taking exists: the per se regulatory 
taking test and the ad hoc test. 
C.  Takings  
1.  Per Se Regulatory Takings and the Ad Hoc Test  
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.200  The 
government may take private property without consent as long as the taking 
is for public use, and the owner is given just compensation.  The Takings 
Clause involves the police power and the eminent domain power.201  When 
an exercise of the police power exceeds its limits and infringes on private 
property without adequate public justification, the owner must be compen-
sated for the loss of his property rights.202  The Takings Clause serves “to 
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”203 
A per se regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment may be 
found when regulations completely deprive an owner of all economically 
viable use of her property unless background principles of nuisance and 
property law independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property 
or when government mandates permanent physical invasions of property.204  
Per se takings require compensation no matter how significant the public 
interest is in the regulation.205 
Categorical rules endorse distinct classifications of takings and are 
characteristics of the nineteenth century legal thinking.206  In the twentieth 
century, courts focused on balancing tests instead of categorical distinctions 
to determine when a regulatory taking existed.207  In 1978 the Supreme 
Court said it “has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining 
when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public 
action can be compensated by government, rather than remain disproportio-
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nately concentrated on a few persons.”208  To apply the ultimate test of “jus-
tice and fairness,” the Court engaged in an ad hoc factual inquiry focusing 
on the following: (1) the “character of the government action,” (2) the pro-
tection of “reasonable, investment–backed expectations,” and (3) the “eco-
nomic impact” of the regulation on the particular owner.209  This ad hoc test 
assumes owners have obligations as well as rights and also weighs private 
and public interests.210 
The per se regulatory test and the ad hoc test are two ways to find 
whether a taking exists.  Under the per se regulatory test, a regulatory tak-
ing will be found in only two instances.  A taking will be found anytime 
there is a permanent physical invasion of private property or if an owner is 
deprived all economically viable use of her property unless background 
principles of nuisance and property law existed.  Under the ad hoc test, the 
court uses a balancing test, not distinct classifications.  While a private 
property owner can assert a takings claim, the government can also assert a 
takings defense against the claim. 
2.  Categorical Taking Defenses  
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, David Lucas purchased 
two coastal lots with the intent to build homes on each lot.211  Two years 
after he purchased the lots, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Man-
agement Act with the objective of preventing public harm as a result of 
beach erosion.212  The Beachfront Management Act precluded Lucas from 
building homes on each lot.213  Lucas filed suit against the state agency in 
charge of implementing the Beachfront Management Act claiming a consti-
tutional taking.214  In 1992 the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in finding no taking.215  The Court 
stated that South Carolina needed to “do more than proffer . . . the conclu-
sory assertion that the prohibited uses violate a common law maxim such as 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use what is yours so as not to harm 
what is others).”216  Instead, to restrain Lucas in a common law action for 
public nuisance, “South Carolina must identify background principles of 
nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the cir-
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cumstances in which the property is presently found.  The government must 
identify background principles of nuisance and property law.”217 
Justice Scalia created a new per se rule expanding categorical tak-
ings.218  Compensation is required for all regulations that deny “all econom-
ically beneficial or productive use of land” unless background principles of 
property or nuisance restricted the use of a claimant’s property at the time 
of the purchase.219  Justice Scalia further stated that: 
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed, but 
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background prin-
ciples of property and nuisance already places upon land ownership.  
A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words do no more 
than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts by 
adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the 
State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementa-
ry power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or other-
wise.220  
Lucas characterized nuisances as harms “to public lands and resources, 
or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities.”221  
Although this exception seemed to focus on a nuisance exception only un-
der common law, many courts now view the exception to include aspects of 
statutory law as a pre-existing limitation on an owner’s title, such as a per-
manent easement.222  Compensation may be resisted, even when regulations 
deprive owners of all economically beneficial use of their land, if the own-
er’s proscribed use interests were not part of the owner’s title at the time of 
purchase.223   
                                                                                                                           
 
217
 Id. at 1031-32. 
 
218
 Id.; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 206, at 324. 
 
219
 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-29. 
 
220
 Id. 
 
221
 Id. at 1030-31. 
 
222
 Patty Gerstenblith, Protection of Cultural Heritage Found on Private Land: The Paradigm of 
Miami Circle and Regulatory Takings Doctrine After Lucas, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 65, 95 (2000) 
(“[W]e assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent easement that was a pre-existing 
limitation upon the landowner’s title.” (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29.)); see also Blumm & Rit-
chie, supra note 206, at 354 (nothing that, although Justice Scalia cautioned against employing legisla-
tively decreed background principles, many post-Lucas courts sided with Justice Kenney to hold that 
state and federal statutes may function as a bar to takings challenges). 
 
223
 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; see also Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council: The Categorical and Other “Exceptions” to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings of Private 
Property Far Outweigh the “Rule,” 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 957 (1999) (stating that under Lucas, if a proper-
ty restriction replicates restrictions inherent in the title to property defined by state and federal property, 
nuisance law, and the emergency exception, the restriction never effects a taking); see also Blumm & 
Ritchie, supra note 206, at 322-27 (stating that Lucas sets forth a requirement that owners must first 
establish that their property interest is unrestrained by prior restrictions. If the use was not acquired 
 
2009] Categorical Defenses for Regulations of Wetlands 271 
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy disagreed with Justice Sca-
lia that background principles cannot be newly legislated or decreed; in-
stead, states should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initia-
tives in response to changing conditions.224  Justice Kennedy articulated the 
need to expand background principles further than the common law because 
“[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of 
regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society.”225  Many lower 
courts follow Justice Kennedy’s concurrence that background principles 
include not only common law but also state statutes.226 
Lucas extended categorical takings liability by creating a new per se 
rule requiring compensation for all regulations that deny “all economically 
beneficial or productive use of land.”227  Before Lucas, categorical takings 
were limited to only permanent physical occupations.228  In Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court held a minor but permanent 
physical occupation of cable installation in an apartment building consti-
tuted a taking.229  In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, Justice Rehn-
quist held a privately owned shopping center required to permit visitors for 
publicly expressive activity and not commercial purposes did not constitute 
a taking.230  The state authorized limitation of the right to exclude others did 
not unreasonably impair the value or use of the owner’s property as a shop-
ping center.231 
An important aspect of the decision in Lucas was not extending cate-
gorical takings liability by creating a new per se rule, but by creating nu-
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merous categorical defenses to defeat takings claims.232  The categorical 
defenses are background principles of nuisance or property law.233  Com-
pensation is not required for regulations that deny all economically benefi-
cial or productive use of land if background principles of nuisance or prop-
erty law restricted the use of a claimant’s property at the time of purchase.234  
Although Lucas extended categorical takings liability, instead of increasing 
the probability of compensation, Lucas’s exceptions created numerous ca-
tegorical defenses in which government defendants could defeat takings 
claims.235  Categorical defenses include background principles of nuisance 
and property law.236 
a.   Background Principles of Nuisance  
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common 
to the general public.237  Situations involving an unreasonable interference 
with a pubic right may include behavior that causes a significant “interfe-
rence with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public 
comfort or the public convenience,” or conduct that “is proscribed by a 
statute, ordinance or administrative regulation.”238  In Lucas, Justice Scalia 
ruled background principles consist of both private and public nuisances 
and that courts should refer to the Restatement (Second) of Torts in deter-
mining what constitutes a nuisance.239  Lower courts were instructed to ana-
lyze the following:  
[T]he degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private 
property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities, the social value 
of the claimant’s activities and their suitability to the locality in ques-
tion, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided 
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adja-
cent landowner) alike.240 
In Sierra Club v. Flowers, denial of a Section 404 permit under the 
CWA would not constitute a taking because the approved mining was in 
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close proximity to a wellfield from which drinking water is pumped daily.241  
Contamination in the drinking water was found where mining occurred 
pursuant to the challenged permits.242  Mining in close proximity to the 
wellfield is an unreasonable interference with the general public’s water.243  
The mining is causing contaminated water, which is a significant interfe-
rence with public health.244  The denial of a permit would not constitute a 
taking because the mining is creating a nuisance.245  The nuisance would 
qualify as a categorical defense under Lucas.246  
Under Lucas, developing wetlands that are critical to water resources 
and essential for public drinking would constitute a nuisance.247  Lucas ad-
vised lower courts to refer to the Restatement of Torts.248  Under the Res-
tatement of Torts, developing wetlands that are critical to water resources 
would constitute a nuisance.249  Developing wetlands that are critical to wa-
ter resources creates a significant degree of harm to public resources be-
cause of contamination, and the value of clean water is greater than the so-
cial value of developing wetlands.250       
Although Lucas recognized that background principles of nuisance 
could defeat a takings claim, many years prior to Lucas, the Supreme Court 
had already recognized a nuisance exception.251  The Supreme Court applied 
a nuisance defense to a takings claim in both Mugler v. Kansas and Keys-
tone Bituminous Coal Association  v. DeBenedictis.252 
In Mugler v. Kansas, the Court rejected a takings challenge to a state 
ban on the manufacture and sale of alcohol because the purpose of the leg-
islation was to avoid injuries to health, morals, or safety of the communi-
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ty.253  Not only did the nuisance exception apply to common law nuisances, 
but also statutorily declared nuisances.  Many years later, the Supreme 
Court once again denied a takings challenge to a state statute that prevented 
individuals from using their property to create a nuisance by applying a 
traditional nuisance exception.254  
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, a Pennsyl-
vania statute required mining companies of coal to leave fifty percent of 
coal beneath the surface of land for the support of buildings.255  The Su-
preme Court held the statute did not constitute a taking, even though twen-
ty-seven million tons of coal was required to be left in place, depriving the 
mining company of all value of its subsurface mineral rights estate.256  The 
Court concluded, “no individual has a right to use his property to create a 
nuisance or otherwise harm others.”257  Keystone protected regulations de-
signed to prevent serious harm from takings liability.258  The majority in 
Keystone recognized that coal mining that caused the destruction of struc-
tures due to the subsidence of surface land was a nuisance, which the law 
could legitimately prevent by stopping the property owners from causing 
harm to others and the public at large.259 
The CWA prohibits issuance of dredge and fill permits of wetlands if 
the proposed mining activity will cause or contribute to significant degrada-
tion of the subject wetlands, measured by significantly adverse effects on 
municipal water supplies.260  Under the FERA, an applicant for a permit to 
conduct activities in wetlands must provide reasonable assurance that state 
water quality standards will not be violated.261  If an individual is denied a 
permit under the CWA or the FERA because development will adversely 
affect municipal water supplies, the denial would not constitute a taking 
under Keystone.262  Similar to Keystone, the denial of the permit under the 
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CWA would prevent individuals from using their property to create a nuis-
ance and harm others.263    
Unfortunately, Lucas seemed to deny the concept found in Keystone—
that harm preventing regulations are immune from takings liability—when 
Lucas stated that South Carolina needed to “do more than proffer . . . the 
conclusory assertion that the prohibited uses violate a common law maxim 
such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use what is yours so as not to 
harm what is others).”264  Instead, the government must identify background 
principles of nuisance based on “relevant precedents.”265  To defeat a tak-
ings claim, the government can identify not only background principles of 
nuisance based on relevant precedents, but also background principles of 
property law.266 
b. Background Principles of Property Law 
Lucas established that background principles of property law inherent 
in the owner’s title at the time of purchase can also defeat a takings claim.267  
The public trust doctrine, natural use doctrine, navigational servitude, cus-
tomary rights, and water rights are a few examples of background principles 
of property law that can be used to defeat a takings claim.268  The public 
trust doctrine is the principle that government is required to protect and 
maintain certain resources for the public’s reasonable use.269  The leading 
case involving the application of the natural use limitation is Just v. Mari-
nette County.270  The court in that case held “[a]n owner of land has no ab-
solute and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his 
land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural 
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state and which injures the rights of others.”271  Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency is a case that helps identi-
fy the aforementioned background principles of property law that can be 
used to defeat takings claims.272 
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, the Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency placed a temporary suspension on construction around Lake Tahoe 
for six years to avoid the loss of Lake Tahoe’s clarity.273  Landowners 
around the lake claimed the temporary suspension took all economically 
viable use of their property and amounted to a categorical taking under Lu-
cas.
274
  The Court clarified that Lucas meant a diminution in the value of 
property must be a complete elimination of value—that is, a 100 percent 
diminution—and held it was not a per se taking of property.275  
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, reasoning that such a long morato-
rium was not related to background principles of property law.276  Instead, 
regulations that are background principles of property law constitute zoning 
and permit regimes because they were longstanding features of land use 
regulations of state property law existing as far back as colonial Boston, 
and New York enacted its first zoning ordinance in 1916.277  Short-term 
delays in improving property caused by zoning and permit regimes are 
longstanding features of state property law and are part of a landowner’s 
reasonable investment-backed expectations.278  A moratorium prohibiting all 
economic uses for a period of six years is not a longstanding, implied limi-
tation of state property law because “moratoria that prohibit all develop-
ment do not have the lineage of permit and zoning requirements and thus it 
is less certain that the property is acquired under the ‘implied limitation’ of 
a moratorium prohibiting all development.”279  
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe-Sierra helps identify regu-
lations that are background principles of property law.280  Rehnquist ac-
cepted valid zoning and land-use regulations as background principles of 
state property law by explaining that “zoning and permit regimes are a 
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longstanding feature of state property law.”281  Under Rehnquist’s reason-
ing, statutes with land-use restrictions older than 1916 would qualify for 
immunity from takings liability.282   Regulations of wetlands that are criti-
cal to water resources and essential to public drinking would constitute a 
background principle of property law because regulations of wetlands have 
existed since 1899.283  Although the CWA, NEPA, and other state statutes 
that regulate wetlands do not have the lineage of New York’s first zoning 
ordinance in 1916, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 helped provide the 
means for the establishment of the CWA.284  The Rivers and Harbors Act of 
1899 contains wetland protection provisions and predates the 1916 New 
York Zoning Ordinance.285  Under Rehnquist’s dissent, wetland protection 
provisions are longstanding features of property law because of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899.286  
Statutes with land-use restrictions, which are not as longstanding as 
New York’s first zoning ordinance, can also constitute background prin-
ciples of property law if they are pre-existing at the time of purchase.  Pre-
existing statutes in many jurisdictions constitute background principles of 
property law.287  An example of a pre-existing statute constituting a back-
ground principle of property law is the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976 (FLPMA) in Reeves v. United States.288   
In Reeves v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims held that the 
FLPMA’s designation of the land in question, as a wilderness study, was a 
background principle of property law.289  There was not a taking because the 
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plaintiffs obtained their mining rights after the land was designated as a 
wilderness study; therefore, the plaintiffs did not have a property interest.290  
The court explained that “[p]roperty interests are ‘created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an in-
dependent source such as state law.’”291  The court further stated that the 
restricting source was the FLPMA, and that the nature of the plaintiffs’ 
property interest was determined by the extent that the FLPMA could pro-
scribe the use of the plaintiffs’ mining claims.292  The court quoted Lucas, 
stating that the government “may resist compensation only if the logically 
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the pro-
scribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”293  The FLPMA 
constituted a background principle of property law and was a defense to the 
takings claim.294   
Regulations of wetlands restrict individual’s property interests similar 
to the FLPMA in Reeves.295  If developers acquire their private property 
after regulations of wetlands are enacted, the regulations should not consti-
tute a taking.296  Similar to Reeves, in which the plaintiffs did not have a 
property interest, developers should not have a property interest in develop-
ing wetlands if a regulation existed at the time of purchase.297  Wetland reg-
ulations, like the FLPMA in Reeves, should constitute a background prin-
ciple of property law and a defense to a takings claim.298       
Although Justice Scalia cautioned in Lucas against using legislatively 
decreed background principles, many post-Lucas courts agree with Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence that state and federal statutes function as takings 
defenses.299  Justice Kennedy disagreed with Justice Scalia that background 
principles cannot be newly legislated or decreed; instead, states should not 
be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to chang-
ing conditions.300  While Justice Kennedy stated that preexisting statutes 
could constitute background principles, he appeared to change his opinion 
in the 2001 Supreme Court case, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.301 
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In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Justice Kennedy held that a preexisting 
statute did not constitute a takings defense.302  The plaintiff in that case, 
Anthony Palazzolo, wanted to develop his waterfront property in Rhode 
Island by filling in coastal marshlands to construct seventy-four homes, but 
he was denied a permit by the state agency in charge of enforcing laws re-
gulating construction on the coast.303  Palazzolo argued that he was denied 
all economically viable use of his property, which constituted a taking, be-
cause he was not allowed to build anything on his waterfront property.304   
The Supreme Court reversed the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s find-
ing that states are insulated from takings claims because an owner acquired 
title after a regulatory law went into effect.305  It is important to note, how-
ever, that the majority opinion did not state that background principles 
could never include preexisting statutes and regulations but that some can-
not defeat a takings claim at the threshold state.306  Preexisting law is fre-
quently referred to as the notice rule: the enactment of a statute prior to an 
owner’s acquisition of property defeats a takings challenge per se.  Howev-
er, this approach, generally adopted by lower courts, was precluded as a 
categorical approach in Palazzolo.307 
Lucas’s categorical defenses to takings claims include background 
principles of nuisance and property law.308  The dissent in Tahoe–Sierra 
helped identify background principles of property law when Chief Justice 
Rehnquist identified zoning and permit regimes as longstanding features of 
land use regulations of state property law.309  Background principles of 
property law could include wetland regulations because wetland regulations 
are longstanding features of land use regulations.310  Although Justice Scalia 
cautioned against legislatively decreed background principles, many courts 
follow Justice Kennedy’s approach in Lucas, despite Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island. Justice Kennedy did not state that all preexisting statutes cannot 
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constitute background principles, but that only some cannot.311  In addition 
to background principles of nuisance and property law, necessity should 
also defeat a takings claim.312 
c. Necessity – Miller v. Schoene 
Necessity should also defeat a takings claim.313  In Miller v. Schoene, 
owners of property with large ornamental red cedar trees were ordered to 
cut down the trees to prevent the spread of a rust or plant disease from the 
red cedar trees to apple orchards in the vicinity.314  The Court held, “[W]hen 
forced to [make] such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional 
powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to 
save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to 
the public.”315  Thus, the ordering of the destruction of the cedar trees was 
not a taking because the cedar rust was fatal to apple trees nearby, which 
were of greater value to the public.  The apple was one of the principal 
agricultural pursuits in Virginia, and millions of dollars were invested in the 
orchards.  Whereas the apple furnished employment for a large portion of 
the population, the red cedar only had occasional use and value as lumber.316  
The Court also stated that the question of whether the cedars constituted a 
nuisance, according to common law or as declared by statute, was irrelevant 
because the choice is controlled by considerations of social policy.317    
Lucas’s background principles of nuisance and property law should 
solve the problem of regulatory takings when private property owners are 
denied the ability to develop wetlands that are critical to water resources 
and essential for public drinking.318  Federal and state statutes, such as the 
CWA and the FERA, are existing rules that determine the nature of an indi-
vidual’s property interests.319  The CWA and the FERA are only two exam-
ples that should constitute background principles of property law to defeat a 
takings claim.320  If an individual owned property before a regulatory initia-
tive that protects wetlands was enacted, background principles of nuisance 
                                                                                                                           
 
311
 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (announcing that background principles “cannot be newly legislated or 
decreed”). 
 
312
 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 206, at 361-62. 
 
313
 See id.; see also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
 
314
 Miller, 276 U.S. at 277.    
 
315
 Id. at 279.  
 
316
 Id.   
 
317
 Id. at 280.   
 
318
 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30. 
 
319
 Compare Sierra Club v. Flowers, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (articulating 
CWA determining the nature of an individual’s property interests), with FLA STAT. § 373 (setting forth an 
individual’s property interests in legislation under FERA). 
 
320
 See Sierra, 423 F.Supp. 2d at 1313; See also FLA STAT. § 373. 
2009] Categorical Defenses for Regulations of Wetlands 281 
 
should defeat the takings claim.321  Developing wetlands that are critical to 
water resources and essential for public drinking should constitute a back-
ground principle of nuisance under Lucas.322  If neither background prin-
ciples of nuisance nor property law can defeat a takings claim, necessity 
should.323      
Although Lucas’s categorical defenses should solve the problem of 
regulatory takings, a few issues in Lucas remain unresolved.324  It appeared 
that the majority opinion in Lucas rejected the traditional nuisance defense 
found in Keystone, and also stated that background principles could be nei-
ther newly legislated nor decreed.325  If background principles cannot be 
newly legislated, then preexisting statutes, such as the CWA and the FERA, 
could not constitute a takings defense, and almost half of all property law 
would be neglected.326  Although lower courts followed Justice Kennedy’s 
approach in Lucas, that background principles could be legislatively de-
creed, in Palazzolo, Justice Kennedy held a different opinion.327  
Part V will argue that when Justice Scalia stated in Lucas that South 
Carolina must proffer more than the maxim “use what is yours so as not to 
harm what is others,” he did not reject the nuisance defense in Keystone; 
rather, Scalia was requiring a narrower reading of the nuisance defense.328  
The following section will also solve the problem of the apparent conflict 
between Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lucas and his majority opinion 
in Palazzolo.329  
V.  LUCAS’S CATEGORICAL DEFENSES SHOULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY TAKINGS 
Lucas’s categorical defenses should solve the problem of regulatory 
takings.330  The problems apparent in Sierra Club v. Strock and Florida 
Rock Industries v. United States will continue to reappear unless private 
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property owners, who threaten regulatory agencies with takings claims, are 
put on notice that they will be defeated by Lucas’s categorical defenses.331  
The interests of private property owners who wish to prosper through eco-
nomic development are in conflict with the interests of those who wish to 
preserve wetlands.332  Developers should be put on notice that if they pur-
chase wetlands that are critical to water resources and essential to public 
drinking, background principles of nuisance and property law will defeat 
any proffered takings claims.333  
Part V will show how Lucas’s categorical defenses can defeat takings 
claims for those who are denied the ability to develop wetlands critical to 
water resources and essential to public drinking, despite the apparent con-
flict between Lucas and Keystone, and also despite the conflicting opinions 
of Justice Kennedy in Lucas and Palazzolo.334   Furthermore, Part V will 
resolve the apparent conflict between Lucas and Keystone by suggesting a 
narrow reading of the nuisance exception.335  Lastly, it will resolve the ap-
parent conflict in Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Lucas and Palazzolo by 
focusing on reasonable regulations.336 
A.  A Narrow Reading of the Nuisance Exception 
1.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council   
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice Scalia stated, 
“South Carolina must do more than proffer the legislature’s declaration that 
the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the con-
clusory assertion that they violate a common law maxim such as sic utere 
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tuo ut alienum non laedas.”337  Instead, if South Carolina sought to restrain 
Lucas in a common law action for public nuisance, background principles 
of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses Lucas intends must be 
identified.338 
In Justice Blackmun’s dissent, he disagreed with Justice Scalia that 
South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and proper-
ty law.339  Justice Blackmun stated that if the legislature was correct in find-
ing the prohibition on building homes on coastal lots prevents serious harm, 
then the Act is constitutional.340  Justice Blackmun, citing Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis stated, “All property in this coun-
try is held under the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not 
be injurious to the community.”341  
2.  Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis  
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the en-
forcement of a law restricting the exercise of mineral rights, the Subsidence 
Act, was not a taking because it was designed to protect public health and 
safety.342  The law restricted the exercise of mineral rights to prevent the 
subsidence of surface areas.343  Keystone protected regulations designed to 
prevent serious harm from takings liability.  The majority stated, “[N]o in-
dividual has a right to use his property to create a nuisance or otherwise 
harm others.”344  Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the nuisance exception to 
the requirement to compensate for taking was narrower than that suggested 
by the majority.345  In Rehnquist’s view, the Court had become lenient in 
accepting government arguments that regulation was necessary to prevent 
harm to the public.346  Anything the government did under the police power 
to promote public health, welfare, and morals, could be articulated as a reg-
ulation to prevent harm because the concept of harm-prevention was coex-
tensive with the police power.347 
In Keystone, the purpose of the Subsidence Act included not only pub-
lic safety, but also concern for the preservation of buildings, economic de-
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velopment, and enhancing the value of surface area lands for taxation.348  
Rehnquist stated that the Subsidence Act was much more than a nuisance 
statute, and that the nuisance regulations exempted from the Fifth Amend-
ment have rested on discrete and narrow purposes.349  A narrow reading of a 
harm-preventing regulation should meet the discrete and narrow purposes 
of nuisance regulations.  
3.  Harm-Preventing Regulation  
Common law public and private nuisance law involves a determination 
of whether a particular use causes harm.350  A public nuisance is an unrea-
sonable interference with a right common to the general public by interfer-
ing with the public health or safety.351  In Lucas, Justice Scalia seemed to be 
concerned with the fact that harm-preventing justifications could be formu-
lated in practically every case, and that the distinction between harm-
preventing and benefit-conferring regulation is in the eye of the beholder.352  
Instead of reading Lucas to reject the nuisance exception of harm-
preventing regulations found in Keystone, courts should read Lucas as re-
quiring a narrower nuisance exception like Rehnquist argued for in Keys-
tone.  Justice Scalia’s statement that South Carolina must proffer more than 
“use what is yours not to harm what is others,” should be interpreted by 
courts as not rejecting the nuisance exception of harm-preventing regula-
tions in Keystone, but as a narrower reading of harm-preventing regulations.  
A narrow reading of the harm exception will help distinguish between 
harm-preventing regulations and benefit-conferring regulations.  
A regulation preventing imminent harm to public health or safety 
should qualify as a narrow reading of the harm exception.  If an applicant 
for a section 404 permit under the CWA is denied a permit for the disposal 
of dredged or fill material onto wetlands, the denial should not constitute a 
taking if the wetland is critical to water resources and essential for public 
drinking.  The denial of the permit would prevent harm to the public by 
preventing the applicant from interfering with water resources rather than a 
general benefit.   
In Sierra Club v. Flowers, the denial of the permit to dredge wetlands 
should not constitute a taking because the approved mining was in close 
proximity to a wellfield from which drinking water was pumped daily.  In 
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Sierra Club v. Strock, the court learned that benzene, a carcinogen, had been 
detected in the water being pumped from the Biscayne Aquifer, the primary 
source of drinking water for Miami-Dade County.353  The contamination 
was found where limestone mining occurred pursuant to the challenged 
permits.354  Limestone mining uses explosives that contain benzene to re-
move limestone from the Biscayne Aquifer.355  Benzene is a chemical 
known to cause cancer.356  The Miami-Dade County Water and Sewer De-
partment (WASD), which is the agency responsible for delivering drinking 
water to Miami-Dade County, had to shut down seven production wells, 
known as the Northwest Wellfield, which draw water from the Aquifer and 
pump the water to water treatment plants.357  The Northwest Wellfield is 
Miami-Dade’s largest single source of water supply and provides 155 mil-
lion gallons of water per day to Miami-Dade County.358  It supplies approx-
imately one million people with water.359  
The denial of the permit under section 404 of the CWA to dredge the 
wetland for limestone should not constitute a taking because the mining 
causes imminent harm to public health.  The contamination of water caused 
by the mining should qualify under the narrow reading of the harm excep-
tion.  If the denial of the permit was not to prevent harm to the public’s wa-
ter supply, but to preserve wetlands for aesthetic and recreational concerns, 
then the denial should constitute a taking.  The preservation of wetlands for 
aesthetic and recreational concerns would not qualify under the narrow 
reading of the harm exception.  Instead it would qualify as a benefit to the 
public, in which compensation would be owed.360     
In Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Army Corps of En-
gineers denied the permit not to prevent harm, but to preserve wetlands for 
aesthetic and recreational concerns.361  The court stated that water pollution 
did not appear to be a problem at wells adjacent to pits and the concern of 
the Army Corps of Engineers was almost exclusively the continued exis-
tence of the wetland.362  The court stated:  
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One who wanted to put toxic wastes in drinking water would encoun-
ter a balancing of public and private interests most unfavorable to his 
position and not likely to result in a compensation award.  Denial of 
the permit frustrates him in doing harm.  On the other hand, a mod-
erate and pro forma polluter such as Florida Rock does no harm.  
Denial of the permit requires it to maintain at its own expense a facili-
ty, the wetlands, which by presently received wisdom operates for the 
public good, and benefits a large population who make no contribution 
to the expense of maintaining such facility.  This appears to be a situa-
tion where the balancing of public and private interests reveals a pri-
vate interest much more deserving of compensation for any loss ac-
tually incurred.363 
A narrow reading of harm-preventing regulations should qualify as a 
categorical defense under Lucas.  Regulations that prevent development of 
wetlands that are critical to water resources and essential to public drinking 
would not constitute a regulatory taking.  A denial of a permit under the 
CWA or under FERA would not constitute a taking.  The regulation would 
qualify under the narrow reading of harm-preventing regulations and, there-
fore, would qualify as a categorical defense under Lucas.  Lucas’s categori-
cal defenses include not only nuisance defenses, but also background prin-
ciples of property law.   
B.  Background Principles of Property Law  
1.  Preexisting Statutes Should Serve as Constructive Notice 
In Lucas, Justice Scalia stated the limitation “cannot be newly legis-
lated or decreed, but must inhere in title itself.”364  Justice Kennedy con-
curred, but articulated the need to expand background principles further 
than common law in response to changing conditions.365   Although Justice 
Scalia cautioned against employing legislatively decreed background prin-
ciples, many post-Lucas courts side with Justice Kennedy in his concur-
rence, holding state and federal statutes may function as a bar to takings 
challenges.366  Many jurisdictions hold that background principles of prop-
erty law include preexisting statutes.  
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In City of Virginia Beach v. Bell, a landowner was denied a permit to 
develop land by the city’s Wetland Board.367  The landowner claimed the 
denial of the permit deprived him of all economically beneficial use and 
constituted a regulatory taking.368  The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia 
Beach awarded the landowner $110,000 plus interest.369  On appeal, the 
court held that because the city’s Coastal Primary Sand Dune Zoning Or-
dinance pre-dated the landowner’s acquisition of property, denial of the 
permit was not a compensable taking.370   
In Kim v. City of New York, a public road in Queens was re-graded.371  
The city placed side fill on a portion of the plaintiff’s property to maintain 
lateral support for a road.372  Plaintiffs alleged they were entitled to com-
pensation for the portion of the property taken by the fill.373  The court dis-
agreed, holding that “in identifying background rules of state property law 
that inhere in owner's title, for purposes of determining whether property 
owner ever possessed property interest allegedly taken by government ac-
tion, courts should look to law in force, whatever its source, when owner 
acquired property.”374  A charter imposed obligations on property owners to 
maintain lateral support for a public highway when the plaintiffs acquired 
their property.375  The city’s subsequent enforcement of the obligation did 
not constitute a taking because the plaintiffs acquired their property with 
constructive notice that the property abutted a public road.376  By raising a 
portion of the plaintiffs’ property up to a legal grade, the city acted in con-
formity with a provision of its charter that was in force when the plaintiffs 
acquired their property.377 
Similar to City of Virginia Beach v. Bell and Kim v. City of New York, 
in which pre-existing laws constituted background principles of property 
law, regulations of wetlands that exist at the time of an owner’s purchase of 
property should also constitute background principles of property law.  Ca-
tegorical exceptions should include pre-existing statutes and regulations to 
respond to changing conditions.  Courts should follow the reasoning of Jus-
tice Kennedy and lower courts.  One changing condition is the critical role 
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wetlands play in preserving water quality and quantity.  Throughout history, 
wetlands were drained and developed because they were considered a nuis-
ance.  Now, in response to water shortages and population growth, people 
realize the importance of preserving wetlands.  All landowners who acquire 
wetlands after federal or state statutes are enacted should acquire their 
property with constructive notice that the pre-existing law will defeat a tak-
ings challenge per se if any restrictions on their property are challenged.  
The CWA, NEPA, and FERA are just a few statutes that should serve as 
constructive notice to property owners who acquire property after their 
enactment.   
2.  The Solution to Palazzolo v. Rhode Island  
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Justice Kennedy held that a preexisting 
wetland regulation did not constitute a takings defense.378  Justice Kennedy 
explained, “Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable 
limitations on the use and value of land.”379  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island did 
not state background principles could never include preexisting statutes and 
regulations, but that some cannot defeat a takings claim.380  The preexisting 
wetland regulation in Palazzolo was one of the regulations that could not 
defeat a takings claim.  Justice Kennedy was concerned with unreasonable 
preexisting statutes and regulations.  Justice Kennedy stated,  “The Takings 
Clause, however, in certain circumstances allows a landowner to assert that 
a particular exercise of the State’s regulatory power is so unreasonable or 
onerous as to compel compensation.”381  This statement should not be read 
to counter what Justice Kennedy said when concurring in Lucas.  Instead, 
the statement should be read to narrow what Justice Kennedy said earlier in 
Lucas.  Federal and state statutes may function as a bar to takings chal-
lenges, but only if they are reasonable.   
A legislative enactment can constitute a background principle depend-
ing on the circumstances involved.  The legislative enactment must be 
based on permissible limitations.382  The Court stated: 
We have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a 
legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state 
law or whether those circumstances are present here. . . . The determi-
nation whether an existing, general law can limit all economic use of 
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property must turn on objective factors, such as the nature of the land 
use proscribed.383 
Regulations that prevent development of wetlands that are critical to 
water resources and essential to public drinking are reasonable.  If an indi-
vidual is denied a permit to develop wetlands, the denial should not consti-
tute a taking because the regulation is reasonable.  In every continent, im-
portant aquifers are falling.384  Less than one-third of the world’s population 
benefits from ample water supplies.385  Some studies predict that by the 
year 2025, almost 50% of the world’s population will be living in water 
shortage areas.386  On a finite planet, economic production must inevitably 
deplete natural resources.387  Instead of this happening presently, it can hap-
pen in the far distant future by preserving wetlands.388  If one is denied a 
permit under the CWA or FERA, the denial should not constitute a taking.  
The CWA and FERA should constitute background principles of property 
law under Lucas.  If one purchases property before a regulation is enacted, 
it would not constitute a background principle under Lucas.  If the defense 
of background principles of nuisance or property law does not exist, then 
necessity should defeat a takings claim.    
C. Necessity – Miller v. Schoene  
In Miller v. Schoene, ordering the destruction of cedar trees was not a 
taking because it was fatal to apple trees, which were of greater public val-
ue.
389
  The Court also found it unnecessary to “weigh with nicety the ques-
tion whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance according to common 
law; or whether they may be so declared by statute” because the choice is 
controlled by considerations of social policy.390   
Similar to Miller v. Schoene, public necessity should defeat a takings 
claim for challenges to wetland regulations.  Freshwater shortages threaten 
the living world by causing hunger and then thirst.391  A water shortage 
would cause hunger before thirst because the dominant use of water is in 
agriculture.392  Water shortages can be prevented by preserving wetlands 
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because wetlands provide water purification and groundwater recharge.393  
Wetland regulations that destroy property value to protect water resources 
are within the public interest and should be immune from takings liability 
because of public necessity.  Similar to Miller v. Schoene, in which apple 
trees were of greater value to the public, water is of much greater value than 
economic production.  Water is 100% essential to human survival and is 
non-substitutable.394    
VI.   CONCLUSION  
Millions of acres of wetlands in the United States have been destroyed.  
The growing awareness of the importance of wetlands and the conse-
quences of their destruction has led to significant governmental regulations 
to preserve wetlands.  Efforts to protect wetlands occur at the national, 
state, and international levels.  The NEPA, CWA, EWRA, and many other 
initiatives provide for the protection of wetlands at the national level.  The 
FWRA of 1972, the FERA of 1975 and 1993, the Warren S. Henderson 
Wetlands Protection Act of 1984, and many other Acts provide for protec-
tion at Florida’s state level.  At the international level, the Ramsar Conven-
tion provides for the protection of wetlands.   
Despite the many efforts to protect wetlands, wetlands are threatened 
by regulatory takings claims.  Private property owners threaten the effec-
tiveness of wetland regulations by claiming unconstitutional takings.  If 
regulatory agencies in charge of enforcing regulations that protect wetlands 
are threatened with takings claims, the agencies might negotiate with pri-
vate property owners instead of protecting wetlands.  This occurred in Sier-
ra Club v. Flowers and Sierra Club v. Strock.     
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council’s background principles of 
nuisance and property law should solve the problem of regulatory takings 
when private property owners are denied the ability to develop wetlands 
that are critical to water resources and essential for public drinking.  Lucas 
created numerous categorical defenses in which governmental defendants 
could defeat takings claims.  The categorical defenses of background prin-
ciples of nuisance and property law should include regulations of wetlands 
that are critical to water resources and essential for public drinking.  Back-
ground principles of nuisance should include wetland regulations that are 
critical to water resources because development would create a significant 
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degree of harm to public resources.  Development of wetlands critical to 
water resources can contaminate the public’s drinking water supply.  The 
regulations will prevent harm to the public health by preventing individuals 
from interfering with the public’s water resources.  The regulation would 
also qualify under the narrow reading of harm-preventing regulations and, 
therefore, would qualify as a categorical defense under Lucas.  
Background principles of property law should also include wetland 
regulations, such as the CWA and FERA.  Wetland regulations existed as 
far back as 1899 and are longstanding features of property law.  Back-
ground principles of property law should also include preexisting statutes.  
The CWA and FERA are examples of preexisting statutes that could defeat 
a takings claim if the landowner acquired their property after the enactment 
of the CWA or the FERA, and the regulations are reasonable.  Regulations 
that prevent development to wetlands that are critical to water resources and 
essential for public drinking are reasonable because the regulations help 
prevent water shortages and water contamination.  
Another defense to regulations of wetlands that are critical to water re-
sources includes necessity.  Although necessity was not apparent in Lucas, 
it was in Miller v. Schoene.  Water is of much greater public value than eco-
nomic development because it is essential to human survival and is not 
substitutable.   
 
 
